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SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS LEGISLATION





This article examines and analyzes the Glass-Steagall Actl (the
Act), which separates commercial banking from investment bank-
ing and concludes that the most plausible explanation for the pas-
sage of the Act derives from a theory that recognizes the role of
special interest groups in influencing legislative outcomes.2 It fol-
lows ineluctably from the application of this theory to the Glass-
Steagall Act that judges, when called upon to interpret the Act,
• Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1982. The author wishes to thank William J. Carney,
David D. Haddock, Fred McChesney and Charles Shanor for helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article.
1 The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name of ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), officially designated the Banking Act of 1933.
See 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1976). The sections of the Banking Act that deal with the separation of
commercial and investment banking are 16, 20, 21, and 32. These sections are "usually the
intended reference when the name Glass-Steagall is used." Note, A Banker's Adventures in
Brokerland: Looking Through Glass-Steagall at Discount Brokerage Services, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1498, 1501 n.12 (1983). For more general discussions of the Act, see Perkins, The Di-
vorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971); Pitt
& Williams, The Glass-Steagall Act: Key Issues for the Financial Services Industry, 11
SEC. REG. L. 234 (1983).
• An impressive literature has developed on the phenomenon of legislation that is the
product of a bargain between some industry, trade or other special interest group and the
legislature. Much of the literature can be traced to Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). See also Aaronson, Gellbom & Robinson, A
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. I, 39-55 (1983) (candidates form pol-
icy programs around identifiable group preferences); Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior
Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & EcON. 151 (1972)
(presenting empirical support for theory); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 344 (1974) (economic regulation serves the private interests of
politically effective groups).
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will face a virtually insurmountable burden3 due to the vast di-
chotomy between the ostensible legislative intent and the actual
motivations of Congress.4
In order to demonstrate this thesis, the article first examines the
language of the Act as well as the formally articulated legislative
intent. These purported justifications for the law are rejected. The
article next describes the phenomenon of special interest group
legislation and considers whether this theory can better explain the
Glass-Steagall Act. The article concludes (consistent with a theory
of the behavior of special interest groups)l5 that the actual motive
behind the passage of the Act can only have been that of protect-
ing one group - investment bankers - at the expense of another
- commercial bankers.
The article, within the context of the proffered theory, also con-
siders the appropriate judicial response to such a statute. Since
there is no basis to legally distinguish or question the legitimacy of
statutes passed at the behest of special interest groups from other
kinds of statutes,6 it would seem therefore that the judicial re-
3 This burden consists of finding a dividing line between investment banking and com-
mercial banking transactions, when, in fact, the distinction between these activities is more
apparent than real since the substance of both transactions is the same. Consumers see the
products of commercial and investment banking as near perfect substitutes for one another.
The consumers of these products are borrowers. These borrowers may obtain money by sell-
ing stock (i.e. purchasing the services of an investment bank) or negotiating a loan with a
commercial bank. The consumer's decision between these alternatives is based entirely on
price. See infra text accompanying notes 24-31. A survey of the major cases under the
Glass-Steagall Act demonstrates, quite predictably, that because of these special problems
inherent in special interest legislation there is virtually nothing left of the distinctions
Glass-Steagall was designed to create.
4 The dichotomy between motive and intent in the interpretation of legislation has
been developed in both the legal and the economics literature. See, e.g., Landes & Posner,
The Independent JUdiciary In An Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 879,
894 (1975) (judges utilize considerable interpretive leeway to rewrite legislation); Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 272 (1982) ("in reviewing a statute, courts are to look to the intent but not to the
motive of the enacting legislature"). The legal literature has focused primarily on constitu-
tional cases. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Moti-
vation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Ely, The Centrality and Limits of
Motivational Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155 (1978).
• See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text for a description of this theory.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 64-66 for a description of other kinds of statutes.
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sponse to all statutes should be the same. Courts, at least with re-
spect to statutory law, are simply the agents of the legislature and
must execute its will when considering clearly constitutional stat-
utes. It follows that the proper discharge of the judicial function
often will consist of enforcing a deal forged between the legislature
and some interest group.
As consideration of the Glass-Steagall Act clearly demonstrates,
one can predict that courts will inevitably have special problems
when faced with special interest group legislation that are not pre-
sent in other cases. Foremost among these problems is the dichot-
omy between legislative intent and legislative motive that is fre-
quently the hallmark of a special interest group statute. Faithful
interpretation of the statute in accordance with its purported (as
opposed to actual) objectives is virtually impossible due to the in-
trinsic incoherence of the legislative mandate. Moreover, it is often
beyond the capacity of the courts to delve into the legislatures' ac-
tual motives when construing pure special interest group legisla-
tion.7 As the analysis of Glass-Steagall will show, another problem
that courts face when dealing with such legislation is interpreting
the actions of the administrative agencies that intercede between
the courts and the special interest groups.
The thesis of this article concerning special interest group legis-
lation is highly relevant to the most important current Glass-Stea-
gall controversy - commercial bank underwriting of commercial
paper. The United States Supreme Court will review in the 1984
term the legality of commercial bank commercial paper activity.8
The Court's final decision with regard to the legality of commercial
bank underwriting of commercial paper will have a significant im-
pact on the structure and functioning of the financial markets.9
This clearly can be seen by noting the role of commercial paper in
the market. Commercial paper consists of short term (average ma-
turity of less than nine months) promissory notes issued by large
7 See Posner, supra note 4, at 272-73.
8 A.G. Becker v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. granted sub nom. Securities Indus.' Assoc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys" 104 S. Ct. 65 (1983).
8 N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1983 at D1, col. 2.
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financial and industrial corporations.1o As such, the commercial pa-
per market is in direct competition with commercial bank loan de-
partments as a source of credit to top industrial borrowers.ll Thus,
if commercial banks are forbidden by the Glass-Steagall Act from
participating in this lucrative line of business, they may see their
share of the financial service market erode dramatically. Invest-
ment banking firms currently engaged in the buying and selling of
commercial paper therefore do not want commercial banks to enter
this lucrative field and possibly capture their share of the market.
But the "commercial paper case," as this litigation has come to
be called, is important for another, more general reason. The case,
and indeed the Glass-Steagall Act itself, represents a striking ex-
ample of the effects of the independent judicial process on the
"deals" struck between special interest groups and Congress and
thus may have, by analogy, a considerable impact on the ability of
the parties to enforce these deals. The conclusion of this paper is
that the judicial process places severe costs and, indeed, perhaps
general constraints on the efficacy of such deals. In sum, the case
may well determine whether there is a Glass-Steagall Act anymore
or whether it has been completely eviscerated by judicial
interpretation.
II. THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
A. Genesis
Congress, like much of the general public, placed much of the
blame for the great Depression squarely on the shoulders of the
nation's commercial banks.12 Prior to 1933, commercial banks en-
gaged in a wide array of securities activities through so-called bank
securities "affiliates." According to Congress, these affiliates "made
one of the greatest contributions to the unprecedented disaster
which has caused this almost incurable depression."l3 Congress,
10 Hurley, The Commercial Paper Market, 63 FED. RES. BULL. 525 (1977); Note, The
Commercial Paper Mar~et and the Securities Acts, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 362, 363-64 (1972).
11 J.P. Judd, Competition Between Commercial Paper Markets and Commercial Banks
39, 48 (Staff Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco).
1. S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
13 75 CONGo REC. 9887 (1932) (remarks of Senator Carter Glass, principal drafter of the
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when reviewing the economic carnage left by the Crash of 1929, did
not tarry over the question of whether or not it should limit the
scope of commercial banks' activities. Rather, the debate centered
on whether commercial banks' investment banking should be pro-
hibited outright or merely regulated.14 Congress chose prohibition,
i.e., outright separation of functions, on the stated theory that the
mere existence of commercial banks' securities operations, no mat-
ter how carefully and conservatively run, is inconsistent with the
best interest of the bank as a whole.Iii The nature of the debate
makes it plain that the commercial bankers, who stood to suffer
from an outright prohibition of certain of their activities, were in a
very weak political bargaining position. Since, as the debates
clearly show, Congress blamed these institutions for the Depres-
sion, it was a perfect opportunity for another interest group,
namely investment bankers, to profit at their expense. The result
of the congressional action, the Glass-Steagall Act, sought to
achieve the complete separation of commercial and investment
banking.16 In other words, the Act is the "Maginot Line"17 of the
financial world.
B. The Mechanics of the Separation - The Legal Maginot Line
The foundation of the Glass-Steagall Act consists of sections 1618
and 21.19 Section 16 prohibits national banks from underwriting,
Glass-Steagall Act).
14 See infra note 15.
to 75 CONGo REC. 9913 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley); Perkins, supra note 1, at 524-
26.
18 Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. V. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 61-62
(1981).
17 Bevis Longstreth, "Current Issues Facing the Securities Industry and the SEC," May
4, 1982 speech to the Securities Industry Association (quoted in Pitt & Williams, supra note
1, at 235.)
18 Section 16, codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1976 & Supp. 1983),
provides that:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [national bank] shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own
account, and the [national bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or
stock ....
18 Section 21, codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(l) (1976 & Supp. 1983), pro-
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selling and dealing in securities. Exceptions are made for munici-
pal bonds and debt obligations of the United States government,
as well as for purchases and sales "without recourse, solely upon
the order and for the account of customers." Section 5(c) of Glass-
Steagall makes the restrictions imposed by section 16 applicable to
state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System.20
Section 21 complements the restrictions imposed on the power
of lending institutions in section 16 by placing restrictions on the
activities of investment banks. Any person "engaged in the busi-
ness of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, . . . stocks,
bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities" is prohibited from
engaging in the business o( administering checking or savings
accounts.21
Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act contain the remain-
ing ramparts of the Maginot Line separating commercial and in-
vestment banking. Section 20 forbids affiliations between banks
and firms "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting,
public sale, or distribution. . . of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes,
or other securities."22 Section 20 was designed to prevent banks
from engaging in investment banking activities in precisely the way
they had engaged in such activities before the Act was passed -
securities affiliates. Finally, section 32 prohibits an individual in-
volved in any aspect of the investment banking business from serv-
vides that:
[It shall be unlawful) for any person, . . . or • . • organization, engaged in the
business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing. • . stocks, bonds, deben-
tures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time. • • in the business of
receiving deposits . . . .
2. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1976) provides that:
State member banks shall be subject to the same limitations and conditions with
respect to the purchasing, selling, underwriting, and holding of investment securi-
ties and stock as are applicable in the case of national banks under paragraph
'Seventh' of section 24 of this title.
2' See supra note 19.
22 Section 20 is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982). For an insightful discussion of sec-
tion 20 and possible "loopholes" therein, see Bock, The Glass-Steagall Act and the Acquisi-
tion of Member Banks by Unregulated Bank Holding Companies, 100 BANKING L.J. 484
(1983).
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ing as an officer, director, or employee of a national or state-
chartered member bank.23
c. Economic Reality - Storming the Line
Much of the controversy concerning differing interpretations of
Glass-Steagall focuses on the definition of the term "security."24
Recently this definitional approach has been resolved by judicial
inquiry into whether the commercial banking service in question is
related to "traditional banking functions."25 This approach is in-
herently unworkable since it seeks to create a dichotomy ex nihilo.
Obviously, the archetypal case of traditional commercial banking is
a bank loan. On the other hand, buying and selling the common
stock of a publicly held corporation is presumably the core func-
tion of an investment bank. But aren't the economic differences
between these activities more apparent than real? A firm in need
of capital may borrow it from a commercial bank or may obtain
the money by selling stock. The firm will select the financing
method that imposes the lowest net cost with all other things
equal. Firms see these operations simply as alternative ways of ob-
taining funds.
Just as firms see borrowing money and selling stock as inter-
changeable methods of raising capital, investors perceive their de-
cision as whether to deposit money in a commercial bank (by buy-
ing a certificate of deposit) or to purchase stock, based upon which
transaction represents the highest net return. This point has been
clearly articulated, albeit in a slightly different context: "In one
.3 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329
U.S. 441, 449 (1947).
.. Kannel, Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections, 97 BANKING L.J. 631, 633-34
(1980) (Glass-Steagall characterizes banking activity as permissible or impermissible on ba-
sis of whether a security is involved in the transaction); Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-
Steagall Have For Today's Financial World?, 95 BANKING L.J. 404, 411 (1978); Note, A
Conduct-Oriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act, 91 YALE L.J. 102, 102 (1981).
•~ See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,
56 (1981) (concluding that "services of an investment adviser are not ... different from the
traditional fiduciary functions of banks"). See infra text accompanying note 26. A.G. Becker
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (review-
ing "traditional lending functions of commercial banks").
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sense every lender of money is an investor since he places his
money at risk in anticipation of a profit in the form of interest.
Also in a broad sense every investor lends his money to a borrower
who uses it ... for a price and is expected to return it one day."26
If there is no real economic difference between a loan and an
investment, then there is no real distinction between a traditional
commercial banking function (lending) and a traditional invest-
ment banking function (buying stock), thus the difficulty of draw-
ing the legal distinction. The Glass-Steagall Act does not contain a
definition of the term "security." At one end of the spectrum,
courts will have little difficulty categorizing such things as common
stock, which has long been considered a "security," or at the other
end of the spectrum, the extension of credit backed by a secured
interest in real property, which has traditionally been considered a
"loan." Congress, at the time it was drafting Glass-Steagall had
distinctions such as these firmly in mind. Other investment vehi-
cles, those that lie closer to the center of the spectrum, such as
commercial paper, or shares in investment funds, defy such easy
categorization.
The Securities Act of 193327 and the Securities Exchange Act of
2. C.N.S. Enterprises v. G. & G. Enterprises, 508 F.2d 1354, 1359, (2d Cir.) cert. denied,
423 U.S. 825 (1975). This case went on to suggest that the "polarized extremes" of commer-
ciallending and purchasing stock are "conceptually identifiable" on the basis of which party
provides the "impetus for the transaction." ld. The court argued that in purchasing stock
the impetus for the transaction comes from "the person with the money" whereas in the
commercial bank lending context the impetus comes from "the person who needs the
money." ld. This is demonstrably false. Often banks aggressively seek out corporate custom-
ers in order to loan them money. Commercial banks refer to their lending activities as "sell-
ing money." Similarly, sellers as well as buyers frequently provide the impetus for stock
transactions.
27 Section 2 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b, states in part:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires -
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-shar-
ing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, ... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "se-
curity", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim cer·
tificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
~ purchase, any of the foregoing.
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193428 both contain definitions of the term "security." The term is
used in a "jurisdictional" context in both of these Acts. Therefore,
courts must resolve the question of whether a certain activity vio-
lates these laws by first ascertaining whether or not such activity
involved a security.29 Although these Acts both contain a definition
of the term "security," these definitions have been the subject of
extensive judicial gloss.30 Although at first glance it would seem
that these decisions would shed light on the definition for Glass-
Steagall purposes, the definition of "security" contained in the '33
and '34 Acts cannot be "borrowed" from these statutes and
adopted for Glass-Steagall because the underlying congressional
purposes for the Securities Acts differs from the congressionally ar-
ticulated purpose of Glass-Steagall.31
28 Section 3 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a), states in part:
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganiza-
tion certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument
commonly known as a "security;" or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note,
draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise linlited.
2. See, e.g., Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (whether noncontributory, com-
pulsory pension plan constitutes a security dispositive in securities fraud case); United
Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (whether shares in nonprofit, coopera-
tive housing complex are securities was dispositive in securities fraud case); S.E.C. v. W. J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (whether interest in a citrus grove development was a "se-
curity" dispositive in injunctive action).
80 Id. See also cases cited in Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security: The "Sale of Busi-
ness" Doctrine under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637, 637-38 n.2 (1982)
(citing twelve recent cases construing "sale of business" doctrine); see id. at 639 n.7 (citing
dozens of cases); see also Lipman, Notes as Securities, 14 REv. SEC. REG. 934 (1981);
Schneider, The Elusive Definition of "Security", 14 REV. SEC. REG. 981 (1981).
8' A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136, 146
(1982) (no reason to assume Congress intended the term "security" to bear the same mean-
ing in the different statutes); see Note, supra note 24, at 110 n.71.
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D. The Ostensible Legislative Intent
Investment Co. Institute v. Camp32 is unquestionably the Su-
preme Court's most influential opinion construing Glass-Steagall.
It has been called the Court's "first and seminal analysis" of the
Act.33 In Camp, the Court struck down a regulation issued by the
Comptroller of the Currency authorizing commercial banks to op-
erate mutual funds because the regulation was held to violate sec-
tions 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall.
The mutual fund plan under review called for customers to
tender between $10,000 and $500,000 to a commercial bank along
with an authorization making the bank the customer's "managing
agent."34 In return, the customer was to be given "units of partici-
pation" expressing the customer's proportionate interest in the
fund assets. These "units of participation" were freely redeemable
and transferable.35
The Comptroller had ruled that these "units of participation"
were not securities within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act.36
The Comptroller's contention was that this kind of bank invest-
ment fund simply makes available to the small investor the bene-
fits of investment management that are available to large investors
through the bank's trust department. The Court rejected the
Comptroller's decision and held that the "units of participation" in
the bank's fund were "securities" for purposes of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act. In reaching its conclusion the Court recounted the
"'hazards' and 'financial dangers' that arise when commercial
banks engage in the activities proscribed by the Act."37 In discuss-
ing these "hazards," Camp presents a lavishly complete presenta-
00 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
00 Ianni, "Security" Under the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Securities Acts of
1933 and 1934: The Direction of the Supreme Court's Analysis, 100 BANKING L.J. 100, 112
(1983). Actually Camp was the Court's second opinion interpreting the Glass-Steagall Act.
The Court had previously decided Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew,
329 U.S. 441 (1947) (interlocking directorates).
.. 401 U.S. at 622.
o·ld.
oe 12 C.F.R. Pt. 9 (1970).
07 401 U.S. at 630 (citing congressional history).
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tion of Glass-Steagall's formal legislative history. It is from analy-
sis of this history that the gulf between the ostensible legislative
intent and the actual legislative motive underlying the Act be-
comes clear. Each of the hazards described constitutes either (1) a
legislative intention to ensure that commercial banks are held to a
higher standard of care when making investments than investment
banks (so-called safety concerns) or (2) a legislative intention that
banks be held to a higher standard of care than other financial
institutions when dealing with customers (so-called conflicts of in-
terest concerns).
1. Banks' Standard of Care When Making Investments
The first hazard described was considered "obvious": that a
bank might invest its own assets in frozen or otherwise imprudent
stock or security investments.3s It is hard to fathom how Glass-
Steagall reduces the risks of banks making imprudent investment
decisions. Perhaps Congress actually believed all investments in
stock or securities to be inherently more risky than all other com-
mercial banking activities. Actually, what is "obvious" is the fact
that bank ownership of high grade, blue chip stock, which is pro-
hibited by the Act, is inherently far less risky than many bank
loans such as those to third world countries or to real estate invest-
ment trusts, to use modern day examples. A possible defense of the
separation prescribed by the Act could be that most stock or secur-
ity purchases are more risky than most personal or commercial
loans. But the incoherence of this defense is apparent. It is just as
likely that the opposite is true, i.e., that most stock or securities
are less risky than most bank loans.
Risk levels are reflected by risk premiums incorporated into in-
terest rates. The higher the risk premium and rate of interest, the
greater the risk of the investment, all other factors being equal.39
The relevant characteristics of a portfolio are its expected return
and its riskiness. Rates of return on stocks should be higher on
38 Id.
38 See generally J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
172 (1973); H. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INvEST-
MENTS (1959).
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average than rates of return on commercial loans if such lending
activity is somehow inherently "safer." There is no evidence that
this is so. And, while commercial lenders -since they hold debt as
opposed to equity instruments - are often in a better position in
case of default, the greater liquidity of stock is a significant safety
feature. Furthermore, the proscriptions of Glass-Steagall do not
apply merely to banks' acquisitions, but to all securities - debt as
well as equity. Clearly, if the relevant indicia of safety is the rate of
return, by forbidding banks from diversifying their asset portfolios
by holding stock, the Glass-Steagall Act makes commercial bank-
ing a riskier endeavor, not a safer one.
Besides this "obvious" danger to bank safety, the Court deter-
mined that the legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act evinces
a congressional concern with the "subtle hazards that arise when a
commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as fiduciary or
managing agent and enters the investment banking business.".0
Several of these dangers can be described generally as a concern
that banks will exacerbate bad lending decisions by "throwing
good money after bad." Camp evinces a concern that a commercial
bank would either invest in a particular company's stock or partici-
pate in the underwriting or promotion of such stock and then
"make its credit facilities more freely available to those companies
in whose stock or securities the affiliate has invested or become
otherwise involved."ol1 In addition to lines of credit, Congress
"feared that banks might even go so far as to make unsound loans
to such companies."ol2 Moreover, just as banks might loan money to
a corporation in order to bolster the value of the corporation's
stock, so too might banks make loans to bank customers that cus-
tomers would use to buy stock, thereby puffing up the price of the
security.ols If the loans were made with the "expectation that (the
proceeds) would facilitate the purchase of stocks and securities,"ol.
then a bank's efforts to manipulate stock prices would influence
the bank to make bad commercial loans.
• 0 401 U.S. at 630.
<lId. at 63!.
•• Id.
'3 Id. at 632. See also S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933).
•• 401 U.S. at 632.
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Each of these "bank stability" arguments is incoherent. Unless a
bank is trying to bankrupt itself there is no reason to believe it
would engage in any of these activities. A congressional attempt to
ensure bank stability for the reasons articulated in Camp and de-
scribed above is analogous to a hypothetical rule that would re-
strict bank loans to one per customer. This rule might be justified
on the grounds that it prevents banks from suffering losses on sub-
sequent loans in order to insure being repaid on the first loan.
Such a rule would clearly do more harm than good since frequently
second loans are fully justified. Banks have more than ample mar-
ket incentives to restrict their lending in such a way as to maxi-
mize net revenue for the bank.
In sum, any notion that Glass-Steagall can be justified on
grounds that commercial banks are somehow made safer by the
Act's prohibitions is clearly misguided, since the law, if anything,
accomplishes precisely the opposite result. If allowed to buy and
sell stocks, commercial banks could diversify their portfolio of as-
sets, thereby reducing risk. Similarly, by entering the investment
banking business, banks could achieve cost savings in numerous
ways;'15 As a firm's costs of operation are reduced, the firm necessa-
rily becomes less risky since such a firm can earn a concomitantly
lower gross return on investment without risking insolvency.
2. Conflicts of Interest
The Supreme Court in Camp articulated a separate though
closely related set of congressional motives behind the Glass-Stea-
gall Act. The legislature was said to have acted under the premise
that public confidence and customer good will are essential to bank
solvency.46 Based on this premise, the Court seemed to believe that
terrible things might happen if a bank depositor lost money on a
•• For example, if allowed to buy and sell stock, banks could take better advantage of
their own internal research capabilities. Commercial banks currently conduct extensive re-
search in the normal course of their commercial lending activities. Similarly, many major
banks operate extensive cash management, stock clearing, and transfer agent functions. All
of these activities could be efficiently integrated into a firm's stock operations if the Glass-
Steagall Act was abrogated.
•• 401 U.S. at 631.
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securities investment bought from a bank.47 For example, the cus-
tomer might withdraw his money from the bank, thereby threaten-
ing the bank's stability. Similarly, if the bank's securities depart-
ment proved unprofitable, public confidence in the bank would
erode.48
None of these public confidence concerns, however, provides a
persuasive justification for Glass-Steagall. There is no reason what-
soever why public confidence in a bank will be threatened more if
the bank loses money in its securities operations than in its lending
operations. It is even more far fetched to presume that the stabil-
ity of the banking system generally is threatened by irate deposit
customers making withdrawals because of losses suffered in stock
purchases. Actually, the effect will be that deposits will simply flow
to those banks that give sound investment advice. These banks,
and a fortiori the banking system, will be strengthened by their
securities activities. Any residual problems will be solved by de-
posit insurance.49
Congress also saw a "plain conflict" between the promotional ac-
tivities of stock brokers who call people up to convince them to
buy stock and the more dignified "obligation of the commercial
banker to render disinterested investment advice."110 The Court
quoted Senator Bulkey, a leading proponent of the Act, for the
proposition that:
Obviously, the banker who has nothing to sell to his deposi-
.. "Congress was also concerned that bank depositors might suffer losses on invest-
ments that they purchased in reliance on the relationship between the bank and its (securi-
ties) affiliate. This loss of customer good will might 'become an important handicap to a
bank during a major period of security market deflation.' " 401 U.S. at 631 (citations omit-
ted). See also 77 CONGo REC. 4028 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Fish).
•• 401 U.S. at 631.
•• The most obvious "residual" problem that might exist is that a commercial bank
could be rendered completely insolvent by losses from its securities activities. Customers are
only harmed by this to the extent that their interests are uninsured. Plainly, it is deposit
insurance, rather than the prohibitions of Glass-Steagall, that insures bank stability and
public confidence in banking. See M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (1963) (deposit insurance was the most important structural
change in banking system and the change most conducive to monetary stability). See also
infra text accompanying note 57•
• 0 401 U.S. at 633.
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tors is much better qualified to advise disinterestedly and to
regard diligently the safety of depositors than the banker who
uses the list of depositors in his savings department to dis-
tribute circulars concerning the advantages of this, that, or
the other investment on which the bank is to receive an
originating profit or an underwriting profit or a distribution
profit or a trading profit or any combination of such profits.51
15
By removing the bank's ability to profit from the sale of securities,
Congress was not ensuring that banks would provide better advice
than investment banks. Congress was ensuring that commercial
banks would provide no advice at all.
Significantly, the Court recognized that Senator Bulkey's plans
to restrict the scope of commercial banks' activities would also re-
strict commercial banks' profitability. In Senator Bulkey's own
words, "if we want banking service to be strictly banking service,
without the expectation of additional profits in selling something
to customers, we must keep the banks out of the investment secur-
ity business."52 The Court's reading of the legislative history in
Camp necessarily implied an extremely broad construction of the
term "security." The Court explicitly recognized that it could only
interpret Glass-Steagall as representing a congressional choice that
investment bank activity is "bad" and must be prohibited regard-
less of the effect on market efficiency: "From the perspective of
competition, convenience, and expertise, there are arguments to be
made in support of allowing commercial banks to enter the invest-
ment banking business. But Congress determined that the hazards
outlined above made it necessary to prohibit this activity to com-
mercial banks."53
III. INTEREST GROUP THEORY
The Court's advertence to the costs Glass-Steagall would impose
on commercial banks shows that the majority in Camp fully recog-
nized the effect of its interpretation of Glass-Steagall. The above
., Id. at 635 (quoting 75 CONGo REC. 9912 (1932»•
•• Id. at 634 (emphasis added) (quoting 75 CONGo REC. 9912 (1932»•
•• Id. at 636.
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review of the legislative history of Glass-Steagall, as summarized in
Camp, demonstrates that the formal intentions articulated in the
statute - promoting bank safety and eliminating conflicts of inter-
est - are not advanced by enforcing the Act's mandate that com-
mercial banks be prohibited from participating in investment
banking. Moreover, the net effect of the statute, as interpreted by
the Court in Camp, may be to thwart the Act's stated goals.ll4
Thus, one is left to wonder why Glass-Steagall was enacted in the
first place. Two hypotheses can be proffered. The first is that the
Act is a misguided, albeit benign, attempt to accomplish its for-
mally articulated objectives; it is a congressional mistake. The sec-
ond hypothesis is that the Act can best be explained as an example
of special interest group legislation. That is, Glass-Steagall repre-
sents the triumph of one special interest group, the investment
bankers, over another interest group, the commercial bankers.
The first explanation, that the Act is simply a result of congres-
sional error, is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, be-
cause it is purely conclusory, it does not explain why Congress
chose to completely ban banks from entering the field of invest-
ment banking. It seems clear that all of the hazards with which
Congress was ostensibly concerned could be handled more effec-
tively by regulation than by outright prohibition.1I11 Moreover, if
Congress' actual motivations were those articulated in the legisla-
tive history, why did Congress do nothing to control other equally
unsound banking practices such as making unreliable commercial
loans?
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was also created by
the Banking Act of 1933.116 This statute requires all national banks
and all state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem to purchase federal deposit insurance. The statute made moot
the issue of "public confidence" in the banking system by mitigat-
ing most depositors' 'risk of loss from bank failures. The effective-
ness of this aspect of the insurance scheme is evidenced by the fact
5< See supra text accompanying notes 32-53.
•• For this point I am indebted to Professor Robert C. Clark, who made this observa-
tion at the 1983 session of the Harvard Law School Program of Instruction for Lawyers•
• 6 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982).
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that runs on banks ceased.57 It is unclear, then, why Congress did
not believe it had reached its articulated goals by the imposition of
deposit insurance. Equally perplexing is that Congress never ex-
plained how brokerage activities make banks riskier.
The alternative hypothesis is that Glass-Steagall was passed be-
cause a special interest group, namely investment bankers (per-
haps along with some commercial bankers who wanted to leave the
field), was able to persuade Congress to prohibit commercial banks
from competing with the group. Interestingly, the Court's decision
on standing in Camp supports this hypothesis. The Court held
that the Investment Company Institute had standing as a competi-
tor to challenge the decision of the Comptroller of the Currency
because Congress legislated against the competition that the peti-
tioners challenged.58
Justice Harlan in dissent recognized the full import of this hold-
ing. He rejected the majority's apparent conclusion that Congress
intended "to protect petitioner's class against competitive in-
jury,"59 and therefore dissented on standing grounds. Harlan's view
was that Congress simply could not have intended to protect the
investment community against competition from commercial bank-
ers when it enacted Glass-Steagall. Indeed, few hints of such favor-
G7 See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 49, at 11; see also S. COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 44 (1973); 1982 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION AN-
NUAL REPORT (describing FDIC's monitoring and insurance activities); Note, supra note 24,
at 106.
•• 401 U.S. 621. See also id. at 639 (Harlan J., dissenting).
'0 [d. at 640 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The dissent brings into sharp focus the difference
between cases such as Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U.S. 166 (1882), Alabama Power Co. v.
Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938), Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), and Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), on the one hand, and the Chicago Junction Case,
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258 (1924), on the other. In the first
group, a plaintiff who was injured on account of "lawful competition" did not have standing
to "question the legality of any aspect of its competitor's operations." Camp, 401 U.S. at 640
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 360 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968». In
the Chicago Junction Case, the Court held that the plaintiff had standing since the statu-
tory provision in question reflected a legislative purpose to protect a particular group
against competition. Camp, 401 U.S. at 640-41 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Comparing the two
groups of cases, the dissent rejected the proposition that Glass-Steagall was en~cted to pro-
tect a particular group against competition.
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itism can be gleaned from the legislative history or from the statu-
tory language itself. Justice Harlan found it "reasonably plain that,
if anything, the Act was adopted despite its anticompetitive effects
rather than because of them."60 The thrust of this approach is that
it preserves a pristine, public policy oriented view of congressional
motives and indirectly supports the congressional mistake hypoth-
esis. To Harlan, since Congress had no defensible reason to pass
legislation protecting the investment industry, it must not have
done such a thing. This approach, however, has two flaws. First, it
leaves us without any justification or explanation for the Act what-
soever. Second, Justice Harlan's approach ignores the important
distinction in statutory analysis between legislative motive and leg-
islative intent. As Judge Posner has observed:
Courts look to the language of the statute, to the legislative
history and to other evidence of legislative intent, but they do
not speculate on the motives of the legislators in enacting the
statute. They do not, in short, conduct the kind of economic
or political science inquiry that might reveal the pattern of
interest group pressures behind the statute.61
Justice Harlan was correct in one respect - the ostensible intent
of the Congress could not have been simply to protect a group so
"unworthy" of protection as investment bankers. But what about
their underlying motive - particularly in the absence of any con-
ceivable alternative justification for their action?
A historian examining the Glass-Steagall Act would conclude
that the Act was promulgated in the wake of the Depression to
lend stability to the nation's faltering banking system.62 An econo-
mist would conclude that this legislation must be looked upon as a
consumable good like any other, and, since legislative protection
invariably "flows to those groups that derive the greatest value
from it, regardless of overall social welfare,"63 to fully understand
Glass-Steagall we must look to the special interest group being
60 401 u.S. at 640 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61 Posner, supra note 4, at 272 (footnotes omitted).
6. ld. S~e also Ianni, supra note 33, at 104.
63 Posner, supra note 4, at 265.
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particularly benefited by the statute. This analysis does not sug-
gest that all legislation benefits some special interest group - only
that some of it does. Other kinds of legislation, as described in an
influential article by Judge Richard Posner, include (1) public in-
terest legislation and (2) "public sentiment" legislation.64 Public
interest legislation is only enacted after an "objective weighing of
demonstrable pros and cons." Such laws generally attempt to cor-
rect market failure and thereby further the public interest by re-
ducing such public 'bads' as pollution and crime or by increasing
such public goods as charitable gifts.65 Public sentiment legislation
cannot be justified on any economic basis at all. Such legislation
attracts wide support often at the expense· of special interest
groups that one might think could block such legislation. Examples
of such public sentiment legislation are pornography and usury
laws.66
The Glass-Steagall Act does not fit the description of "public in-
terest" legislation. As analyzed above, the formally articulated,
public-spirited justifications for the Act are best achieved by not
enforcing the statute rather than enforcing it. It is possible, how-
ever, that Glass-Steagall could be described as a peculiar kind of
"public sentiment" legislation. Conceivably, Congress could have
passed Glass-Steagall as a result of public pressure to "punish" the
nation's commercial banks for their role in "bringing about" the
Depression. This seems an unlikely possibility. Increasing taxes
would have been a more effective punishment, and besides, it is
unlikely that the public would have supported a statute that raised
the cost and therefore the price of commercial banking merely for
the sake of doing so. It is highly unlikely that an effective political
coalition could have formed around such a policy.
The triumph of a particular interest group is an especially likely
.. [d. at 270-72. But see generally P. ARANSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND
CHOICE (1981) (arguing that all legislation is special interest legislation).
e. Posner, supra note 4, at 271.
ee [d. It is likely that many laws cannot be justified on economic grounds simply be-
cause we do not have sufficient data on the cause and effects of such legislation. For exam-
ple, it may be that it is efficient to eliminate pornography because of the concomitant reduc-
tion in the crime rate or because of some other even more obscure rationale. Posner, supra
note 4, at 271. .
HeinOnline -- 33 Emory L. J. 20 1984
20 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
explanation for the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act. The theory
predicts that more powerful groups are more likely to see their in-
terests reflected in legislation than weaker groups. Commercial
banks, which had been found to be largely responsible for the De-
pression, were in no position to adequately defend themselves dur-
ing the early 1930's. The group that benefited initially from the
Act were the investment bankers,67 a small, cohesive group that
was well organized and concentrated in the City of New York. It is
also likely that some segment of commercial banks wanted to
abandon investment banking, but only if their competitors were
barred from taking customers away by offering the service. Thus
the investment banks lobbying for the Act may have been aided by
a small coterie of commercial bankers sympathetic to their goals.
This possibility, of course, in no way detracts from the special in-
terest group nature of the legislation. For the purposes of this arti-
cle, a precise description of the interest group or coalition of such
groups is not crucial. The relevant fact is that Glass-Steagall
clearly represents an agreement between a special interest group
and the legislature.
While the above interest group theory has immense intellectual
appeal, especially when applied to a statute such as the Glass-Stea-
gall Act where a plausible alternative justification is lacking6S the
analysis provides no guidance whatsoever to courts trying to apply
laws that "have nothing to do with the public interest, whether
defined in efficiency or equity terms."S9
Special interest group legislation places a heavier burden on
courts than public interest or public sentiment types of legislation.
The Glass-Steagall Act, as discussed below, provides an excellent
example of the difficulties faced by courts when called upon to
construe such legislation. When public sentiment or public interest
types of legislation are construed by courts "the actual and the os-
tensible purposes coincide."70 As Glass-Steagall demonstrates,
., See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text. Ct. S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2, 3-7, 10 (1933).
•s See Posner, supra note 2, at 344 (describing appeal of theory).
•• Posner, supra note 4, at 266.
10 [d. at 273.
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when the statute represents a bargain struck between a special in-
terest group and Congress,
it will not be clear, at least without an inquiry that is beyond
the judicial competence to undertake, how completely the
group prevailed upon Congress to do its will. The statute as
ultimately enacted may represent a compromise with other
groups; if so, the real legislative purpose may be unclear.71
IV. SETTING THE STAGE: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF GLASS-
STEAGALL AFTER Camp
The remainder of this article seeks to provide an indication of
how legislation explained by the special interest group theory is
likely to fare in the courts. As mentioned above, the vehicle by
which this analysis will proceed is the impending Supreme Court
decision in A. G. Becker v. Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System. As the Court faces its commercial decision, it is clear
that the Court's earlier analysis in Camp has crumbled under the
weight of the incoherence of its statutory analysis. The Court can
hardly be blamed, however, since the legislature gave it virtually
nothing with which to work.
A. The Post-Camp Period
The Supreme Court's next OpInIOn construing the "security"
concept under Glass-Steagall came eleven years after Camp in
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment
Co. Institute [hereinafter referred to as Board of Governors v.
ICI].72 This opinion is important because it represents a sharp de-
parture from the Camp decision. Board of Governors v. ICI set the
trend for the current, permissive way that Glass-Steagall is now
interpreted and brought the "closely related to banking" concept
of the Bank Holding Company Act7S into direct confrontation with
Glass-Steagall's prohibition against banks' dealing in securities.
71 [d. (emphasis in original).
7' 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
73 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
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The Bank Holding Company Act prohibits bank holding compa-
nies from engaging in activities that are not closely related to
banking. The Federal Reserve Board has been given the authority
to allow bank holding companies to engage in business activities
that are "so closely related to banking. . . as to be a proper inci-
dent thereto."74 In 1972 the Federal Reserve Board amended its
"Regulation Y," thereby expanding the list of permissible commer-
cial banking activities to permit commercial bank holding compa-
nies and their affiliates to act as investment advisers to closed-end
investment companies.7ll Both closed-end investment companies
and open-end investment companies (which were the subject of the
dispute in Camp76) sell shares to customers and use the proceeds
of such sales to purchase a portfolio of other securities in the open
market. Banks profit from both activities in the same way, by tak-
,. The original act provided, in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no bank holding company shall -
(1) after acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of
any company which is not a bank, or . • •
(c) The prohibitions in this section shall not apply to .•• (6) shares of any com·
pany all the activities of which are of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature
and which the Board after due notice and hearing, and on the basis of the record
made at such hearing, by order has determined to be so closely related to the
business of banking or of managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto and as to make it unnecessary for the prohibitions of this section to apply
in order to carry out the purposes of this Act . . • •
Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4, 70 Stat. 133, 135-37 (1956).
The relevant exemption is now found in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982) which allows hold-
ing company ownership of:
(8) shares of any company the activities of which the Board after due notice and
opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto . . • • In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to
banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider whether its
performance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected to
produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition,
or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue con-
centration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interests, or
unsound banking practices. In orders and regulations under this subsection, the
Board may differentiate between activities commenced de novo and activities
commenced by the acquisition, in whole or in part, of a going concern.
12 U.S.C: § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
7. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 49-
50 (1981).
7. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
HeinOnline -- 33 Emory L. J. 23 1984
1984] THE DILEMMA OF GLASS-STEAGALL 23
ing a fee and distributing the remaining revenues among the cus-
tomers on a pro rata basis. The distinction between "closed" and
"open" ended funds is that an open-end investment company (also
known as a mutual fund) is "continuously engaged in the issuance
of its shares and stands ready at any time to redeem the securities
as to which it is the issuer,"" while a closed-end investment com-
pany does not stand ready to redeem its shares and only issues
such shares occasionally, not continuously.
Despite its earlier conclusion that serving as an investment ad-
viser to an open-end investment company violates Glass-Steagall,
in Board of Governors v. ICI the Supreme Court upheld a determi-
nation of the Federal Reserve Board that serving as an investment
adviser to a closed-end investment company does not violate the
Act. The Court opined that, for Glass-Steagall purposes, the
closed-end investment company question "presents an entirely dif-
ferent issue" from the open-end question the Court had previously
faced.'8 The Court's distinction stemmed from two factors. First,
the Federal Reserve Board had expressly prohibited commercial
banks from issuing, underwriting, selling, or redeeming shares of a
closed-end investment company.'9 Second, closed-end investment
companies were subject to "restrictions imposed by the [Federal
Reserve] Board [which] ... would also preclude the promotional
pressures that are inherent in the investment banking business."8o
This opinion ignored the bank safety issues that informed Camp
and expressly recognized that any conflict of interest problems
which Congress imagined might exist when commercial banks sell
securities can be solved easily by administrative regulation. This
conclusion by the Court constituted a judicial amendment of the
Glass-Steagall Act and an obvious departure from the previous
holding in Camp. As Camp made clear, the congressional history of
Glass-Steagall indicates that Congress preferred outright prohibi-
tion over regulation as the means for controlling banks' investment
77 450 U.S. at 51 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(c) (1980».
78 ld. at 65-66.
7. ld. at 66.
80 ld. at 67.
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activity.81 This conclusion was arrived at after lengthy debate.82
The proposition that if sufficiently regulated, a commercial bank
may conduct securities activities consistent with the rationale of
Glass-Steagall is completely unsupportable.
Next, the so-called dangers that the Court recognized in Camp
are in no way diminished by the fact that the entity issuing the
securities in Board of Governors v. ICI was a closed-end invest-
ment company while the entity in Camp was an open-end invest-
ment company. For example, a commercial bank is just as likely to
invest its own assets in imprudent investment vehicles via one en-
tity as via the other. Similarly, banks might make loans to custom-
ers to facilitate the purchase of closed-end investment shares just
as banks might make loans to customers to facilitate purchases of
shares of open-end companies. A bank is just as likely to make
unsound loans to companies in which the closed-end fund has in-
vested as it is to make unsound loans to companies in which the
open-end company has invested. Finally, bank investors might suf-
fer losses (shares in closed-end investment companies are freely
traded in the secondary market) on shares in closed-end companies
to the same extent as customers might suffer losses on investments
in open-end companies.
For those wondering what is left of the Glass-Steagall Act after
Board of Governors v. ICI the answer is clear. Interpretation of the
Act has been taken out of the hands of the courts and placed in
81 401 U.S. at 629-30 (citing S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 1933); 77 CONGo
BEe. 3835 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall); ide at 4179-80 (remarks of Sen. Bulkley); 75
CONGo BEe. 9913 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley) (mere existence of commercial bank se-
curities operation "no matter how carefully and conservatively run is inconsistent with the
best interests of the trust company ••. as a whole.")j Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial
and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 506-07 (1971).
82 See Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearings on
S. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Banking of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
71st Cong., 3d Sess., 19-22 (1931) (testimony of J.W. Pole, Comptroller of the Currency)j ide
at 191-92 (testimony of Albert H. Wiggin, Chairman of the Board, Chase National Bank);
ide at 238-41 (testimony of B.W. Trafford, Vice-Chairman, First National Bank of Boston);
ide at 301-04,318 (testimony of Charles E. Mitchell, Chairman of the Board of National City
Bank of New York); ide at 356, 364-65 (testimony of Owen D. Young, Chairman of the
Board, General Electric Co.); ide at 539-43 (statement of Allan M. Pope, Executive Vice-
President of First National Old Colony Corp.).
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the hands of the regulatory authorities. Camp represents an exam-
ple of the judiciary implicitly enforcing the terms of a bargain
struck between the legislature and a special interest group. Board
of Governors v. ICI is an example of the Court's inability to explic-
itly recognize and therefore enforce the original bargain struck by
the legislature. The distinction is that in the latter case a regula-
tory agency has persuaded the Court that enforcing the "bargain"
does not achieve the Act's purported objectives. It is important to
note that the regulatory agency, the Federal Reserve Board, repre-
sents the commercial banking industry, not the investment bank-
ers who were the intended beneficiaries of the legislation. The Fed-
eral Reserve, as "agent" of the commercial banking interests, was
easily able to convince the Court that the restrictions on bank ac-
tivities imposed in Camp were unnecessary to bank safety. This
occurred because lacking any underlying support in logic, the
Camp decision was bound to deteriorate. As will be developed
more fully below,83 when the Glass-Steagall Act is involved, defer-
ence to the determination of the relevant administrative agency re-
sults in abrogation of the original legislation. The Glass-Steagall
example indicates that there may be severe limitations on the effi-
cacy of special interest group legislation, particularly on the lon-
gevity of such legislation. These limitations on the impact of spe-
cial interest group legislation, at least in the case of the Glass-
Steagall Act, may be far more severe than those recognized by
Judge Posner.8'
B. The Post-Modern Period: The Evisceration of Camp
After the Securities and Exchange Commission eliminated fixed-
rate brokerage commissions in 1975,85 a group of specialty firms,
called "discount" brokerage firms sprang up and began acquiring a
significant share of the market for customers' securities orders.86
.3 See infra text accompanying notes 85-111.
•• See Posner, supra note 4, at 273. See also supra text accompanying notes 61-71.
•• See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10383 [1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 'I! 79,511 (Sept. 11, 1973); Securities Acts Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-
29, § 4(e)(1), 89 Stat. 104 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1) (1982».
•• Carrington, Discounters Are Taking Ever-Wider Slice of Brokerage Commissions,
SIA Study Finds, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1983, at 7, col. 1.
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Discount brokerage firms differ from traditional brokerage firms in
that they "generally do not employ a research staff or commis-
sioned account executives," do not give investment advice, and
purchase and sell stock only when directed to do so by customers.8?
On January 7, 1983 the Federal Reserve Board authorized a
commercial bank holding company, Bank America Corporation, to
acquire the Charles Schwab Corporation, the sole owner of Charles
Schwab and Company, the nation's largest "discount" brokerage
firm.88 The Securities Industry Association, a trade group that rep-
resents over 540 securities brokers, dealers, and investment bank-
ing companies, petitioned for judicial review of the Board's order.8o
Judge Lumbard, speaking for the Second Circuit in Securities
Industry Association v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve
System,90 began his opinion by acknowledging an extraordinary
degree of deference to the Federal Reserve Board. The court
opined that the Board's opinion, due to its expert knowledge of
commercial banking, was "entitled to substantial deference"ol and
must be upheld unless found to be unreasonable. In upholding the
Federal Reserve Board's decision, the court analyzed Section 20 of
the Glass-Steagall Act, which states that:
[N]o member bank shall be affiliated in any manner ... with
any corporation, association, business trust, or other similar
organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, un-
derwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail
or through syndicate participation of stock, bonds, deben-
tures, notes, or other securities ....92
Since Bank of America's acquisition of Schwab made the broker-
age firm an affiliate of the bank,9s the bank would be in violation of
81 Note, A Banker's Adventures in Brokerland: Looking Through Glass-Steagall at
Discount Brokerage Services, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1498, 1498-99 (1983).
88 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 716 F.2d 92,
94 (2d Cir. 1983).
81 [d. at 94.
"' 716 F.2d 92.
"' [d. at 95.
"' [d. at 95-96 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1976)} (emphasis by the court).
IS 716 F.2d at 96 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 221(a)(b} (1976)}.
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Section 20 if Schwab were "engaged principally in the. . public
sale or distribution of . . . stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or
other securities."94 Despite the fact that Schwab's business prac-
tices, which include mass advertising via national television, seem
to plainly involve the public sale of stock, the Second Circuit held
that the mere execution of orders for the purchase and sale of se-
curities on behalf of others does not involve the "public sale" of
securities.95
Turning to the policies behind the Glass-Steagall Act, the court
made a persuasive argument in support of its conclusion. Consis-
tent with the methodology of Board of Governors v. ICI, Judge
Lumbard addressed the two ostensible concerns of the legislature
and concluded that neither of these concerns was threatened by
commercial bank involvement in the discount brokerage business.
First, the court examined the bank safety concern.96 As discussed
earlier, the principal safety concern is that the bank might invest
its own assets in imprudent stock or securities investments.97 The
court concluded that since Schwab trades only as agent, it would
not be possible for Bank of America to invest its own assets in any
unwise investment contract.98 Moreover, because Schwab does not
offer investment advice to customers, the court considered that
"the losses that some customers will sustain on trades executed
through Schwab will be unlikely to impair public confidence in the
Bank."99 The court then turned to the second legislative goal-that
bankers conduct themselves in such a way that there is no appear-
ance of conflict between their primary obligation to give disinter-
ested investment advice and their promotional role as an invest-
ment banker. This goal is not threatened according to the court
because Schwab has no "'salesman's interest' in the securities it
trades"loo and, therefore, the Bank has no incentive to promote
.. See supra text accompanying note 92.
95 716 F.2d at 96.
M See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
87 Id.
•• 716 F.2d at 97, 98.
•• Id. at 98.
100 Id.
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one security over another.10l Schwab's stated policy of not offering
any investment advice also strongly supported this conclusion.
The court next considered whether Schwab's discount brokerage
business was in violation of The Bank Holding Company Act.l02 As
discussed above/os the relevant inquiry here is whether the dis-
count brokerage services offered by Schwab were "so closely re-
lated to banking ... as to be a proper incident thereto.mo. Here,
exclusively on the strength of its decision to afford great deference
to the Federal Reserve Board, the court upheld the Board's conclu-
sion that the brokerage business is closely related to banking.lOll
Under this analysis, however, the Bank Holding Company Act
would complete swallow the Glass-Steagall Act. Giving investment
advice is closely related to banking/06 buying and selling stock is
closely related to banking,107 and underwriting and trading securi-
ties are presumably closely related to banking.lOS
The court analyzed commercial bank involvement in the dis-
count brokerage business on the basis of whether this activity actu-
ally posed risks to the nation's banking system. The answer, of
course, was a resounding "no." And, in fact, the division between
commercial and investment banking has eroded even further.
Subsequent to the Second Circuit's opinion in Securities Indus-
try Association v. Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency approved an application by the American National Bank,
which had previously obtained permission to operate a discount
brokerage business, to establish an operating subsidiary to provide
an investment advisory service.l09 The combination of these two
101 Id.
10. Id. at 100 (construing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 et seq. (1976».
103 See supra text accompanying note 74.
104 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
loa 716 F.2d at 102.
lOG 450 U.S. 46, 55 (1981).
107 716 F.2d 101.
108 Banks traditionally underwrite municipal bonds and participate in investment
banking abroad. Trading activity is widely conducted by commercial banks not only in mu-
nicipal bonds, but also in the foreign exchange and government securities markets.
109 Ruling Allows Bank to Offer Investment Advisory Service, American Banker, Jan.
14, 1983, § 1, at 4.
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events - the Second Circuit decision to permit commercial banks
to engage in discount brokerage, and the decision of the Comptrol-
ler to allow such banks to provide investment advice - abrogates
the "bargain" between the special interest group and Congress and
leaves very little of Glass-Steagall intact. The nucleus of facts re-
lied upon to support the court's decision in Securities Industry
Association v. Board of Governors is dramatically different when a
bank is also operating an investment advisory service in its constel-
lation of financial services. The Comptroller's ruling obviously con-
tradicts the court's finding that, because Schwab did not "offer in-
vestment advice, customers who trade unsuccessfully will have
only themselves, and not Schwab or the Bank, to blame for their
mistakes."llo Other potential hazards such as the danger that
banks might make loans to customers to facilitate the purchase of
securities promoted by the bank, or that public confidence in the
bank would be impaired if stocks recommended by the bank fared
poorly, are also implicated by the combination of these two deci-
sions. American National Bank's discount brokerage firm and in-
vestment adviser share the same name (Impact) and address (the
headquarters location of the bank). Furthermore, the bank's appli-
cation indicated that "there may be some referrals of customer/
clients from brokers to adviser and vice-versa."lll
As a result of the Comptroller's decision, the rockslide that be-
gan with Board of Governors v. ICI is now an avalanche. As the
commercial paper litigation illustrates, the trend noted above -
administrative intrusion into the bargain struck between an inter-
est group and the legislature - is now the norm in Glass-Steagall
litigation.
C. The Commercial Paper Case
The Comptroller's favorable decision in the application of the
American National Bank left only one major aspect of Glass-Stea-
gall unscathed. This aspect - commercial bank acquisition of se-
curities as principal- is an important facet of the dispute in A.G.
110 716 F.2d at 98.
m American Banker, supra note 109, at 4.
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Becker v. Board of Governors. ll2 This case represents another ex-
ample of judicial reliance on the expertise of an administrative
agency. Judge Wilkie, speaking for a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that:
The task of the reviewing court is not to interpret the statute
as it [thinks] best but rather the narrower inquiry into
whether the [agency's] construction was 'sufficiently reasona-
ble' to be accepted by a reviewing court. . . . To satisfy this
standard it is not necessary for a court to find that the
agency's construction was the only reasonable one or even the
reading the court would have reached if the question initially
had arisen in a judicial proceeding.ll3
The court advanced four reasons why the Federal Reserve
Board's opinion was entitled to such deference.ll4 First, the
Board's general supervisory powers over member banks convinced
the majority that Congress had delegated to the Board primary
and substantial responsibility for administering federal regulation
of the national banking system.UII Second, because the banking
system is highly technical and specialized, the Board's judgment
should be conclusive on any close question since their "specialized
experience gives them an advantage judges cannot possibly have"
when ascertaining congressional intent.u6 Third, the court con-
cluded that deference to the Board's conclusion was appropriate
because "the agency's decision applied general, undefined statutory
terms - notes and securities - to particular facts. "117 Fourth, the
112 693 F.2d 136, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom. Securities Indus. ABs'n
v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 65 (1983). Becker arose from the following events. On July
26, 1978, Bankers Trust Company began selling third party commercial paper. See Note,
supra note 24, at 115. On September 26, 1980, the Federal Reserve Board ruled that Bank-
ers Trust's participation in the commercial paper market did not violate Glass-Steagall.
Federal Reserve System, Statement Regarding Petitions to Initiate Enforcement Action
(Sept. 26, 1980) (unpublished).
113 693 F.2d 136, 140 (citations omitted).
11< The court nowhere seems to realize that the Federal Reserve Board's analysis, as
that of an agent for the commercial banks, may not be totally disinterested.
115 [d. at 140. See also 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1976).
118 [d. (quoting Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441
(1947».
117 [d.
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sheer thoroughness of the Board's consideration of the problem in-
dicated to the court that great deference was justified.lls
The court next made an independent inquiry into the language
and legislative history. However, the majority, unlike the majority
in Camp, failed to recognize the protectionist nature of the legisla-
tion it was called upon to interpret, and therefore, inevitably
reached a different result. Judge Wilkie considered whether "com-
mercial paper" more closely resembles a note evidencing a bank
loan (which is of course permitted under the Act) or an investment
note (which commercial banks are prohibited from underwrit-
ing).l19 As noted earlier,120 this sort of inquiry is bound to be un-
fruitful because the dichotomy between investment banking and
commercial banking is more apparent than real. In the end the
D.C. Circuit acknowledged this, finding the statutory language
"not conclusive."
The D.C. Circuit made an accurate assessment of the ostensible
legislative intent as articulated in Camp. The court concluded that
"bank stability" was not threatened by commercial paper sales and
any "conflict of interest presented here may be entirely eliminated
by an authorized regulation of the Board."l21 But by failing to rec-
ognize that it was construing a piece of special interest group legis-
lation, the court reached a perfectly logical result that was com-
pletely at odds with the protectionist origins of the Act. The court
correctly observed that commercial paper is very safe, as evidenced
by its low default rate and short maturity.122 The court also
pointed out - again correctly - that commercial paper is only
purchased by large and sophisticated investors such as "pension
funds, money market funds, insurance companies and nonfinancial
corporations with large amounts of idle cash."123 The court con-
cluded the bank's purchase of commercial paper was "less risky
118 [d. at 14l.
118 [d. at 144.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 24-3l.
111 Becker, 693 F.2d at 151 n.96.
122 [d. at 149.
123 [d. See also Hurley, The Commercial Paper Market, 63 FED. REs. BULL. 525 (1977);
Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and The Securities Act, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 362
(1972).
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even than banks' ordinary commerciallending."l24
Given that all of this is true, this analysis applies with equal
force to a bank's sale of large blocks of blue chip stock to institu-
tional investors - an activity clearly prohibited by the plain lan-
guage of Glass-Steagall. Moreover, the lack of generality in the
court's argument is seen when one realizes that the court's ration-
ale would evaporate if applied to the sale of commercial paper in
smaller denominations to the general public.1211 This problem was
finessed by the D.C. Circuit by turning to the universal bromide -
deference to the appropriate administrative agency, the Federal
Reserve Board. The Board "will be called upon to determine in
varying fact situations the scope of activities that Congress in-
tended to permit banks to undertake."l26 The majority in A.G.
Becker v. Board of Governors did not enforce the bargain struck
between the legislature and the special interest group proponents
of the legislation. Distinguishing between motive and intent, it is
obvious that bank stability was only the purported intent of the
Act. The actual motive consisted of protecting a special interest
group - investment bankers. There is ample evidence that this
group will be seriously injured by the court's decision because their
market share of the commercial paper industry faces serious ero-
sion as other banks enter the fray.127
In reaching its decision, the D.C. Circuit also independently ex-
amined the legislative history of Glass-Steagall to determine
whether Congress considered commercial paper to be included
within the scope of Glass-Steagall.12s Although this inquiry is irrel-
evant to the policies that Glass-Steagall is supposed to advance,
such an inquiry might have led the court to enforce the bargain
... 693 F.2d at 149.
125 See id. at 151-52.
12·Id.
127 693 F.2d at 138 (other banks await outcome of legal proceedings before entering
market); Bennet, Corporate Loans Soar at Banks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1980, § D (Busi-
ness), at 1; SECURITIES WEEK, Dec. 18, 1978, at 2.
12. 693 F.2d at 144-45. Note that there have been dramatic changes in the commercial
paper market since Glass-Steagall was enacted. In the 1930s, when the Act was passed, com-
mercial paper was not promoted or traded the way it is today. Commercial paper was simply
purchased by banks and held to maturity as an asset. Note, supra note 24, at 117-18.
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struck when the Act was passed. In this case it did not because the
court did not distinguish between motive and intent.
The court also analyzed the policies behind the Act and con-
cluded that commercial bank underwriting does not pose the con-
flicts of interest envisioned by the drafters of Glass-Steagall. The
court first observed that, as a practical matter, a bank could not
use its credit facilities to facilitate the sale of its commercial paper
because the interest on such credit is higher than the interest on
the commercial paper. In like fashion the court was not concerned
that a bank might suffer a loss of public confidence or depositor
good will by promoting commercial paper.129 As the court noted,
commercial paper is purchased only by investors capable of fend-
ing for themselves, and the debt instruments are issued only by
corporations about whom current financial data is widely availa-
ble.13o The court was certainly correct that commercial bank trad-
ing of commercial paper involves none of the conflicts of interest
that worried Congress. The Circuit Court failed to observe, how-
ever, that none of the other activities proscribed by Glass-Steagall
pose such dangers either, especially when coupled with strict regu-
latory supervision.131
It is readily apparent that courts dealing with the Act on a case
by case basis have consistently failed to enforce the deal struck
between the special interest group and the legislature. Courts have
no capacity to enforce the statute as a "bargain." The judiciary
was not a party to the original deal struck in Congress and thus
was not privy to the true motives informing the Act. Moreover, the
parties whose interests are damaged by the Act have every incen-
tive to litigate and proffer interpretations contrary to the original
motives. The cases demonstrate that these parties have been able
to destroy the theoretical justifications of the Act, thereby leaving
the courts with no alternative but to reach results that undermine
the Act. This is an inevitable result of the mechanics of the judicial
1.9 693 F.2d at 150.
130 [d. at 150-51 ("even if a commercial paper issuer were to default, the sophisticated
purchasers of commercial paper will understand that this paper is not backed by the guar-
antees on commercial bank deposits").
131 [d. at 151.
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process itself.132 Judges must write opinions. These opinions must
be persuasive, and to be persuasive they must be logical. Special
interest legislation, such as Glass-Steagall, passed in order to favor
a special interest group cannot achieve this purpose unless courts
are given some basis in logic to enforce it. No such logical under-
pinnings accompanied Glass-Steagall, and the Act has been
eviscerated.
Glass-Steagall does not actually promote bank safety, despite
the fact that this is the primary ostensible legislative purpose. Fur-
thermore, whatever conflicts of interest may arise from bank in-
volvement in securities activity, they can be ameliorated ade-
quately by regulation. Judicial recognition of these facts, coupled
with deference to administrative expertise by an agency that repre-
sents interests opposed to the prohibitions of the Act has resulted
in a telling defeat for a major piece of special interest group legis-
lation. This defeat indicates the inherent difficulty of enforcing
this kind of legislation generally and leads to the inevitable conclu-
sion that under some circumstances special interest group legisla-
tion is more costly and less resiliant than either public interest or
public sentiment kinds of statutes.133
V. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR WHEN CONFRONTED WITH SPECIAL
INTEREST GROUP LEGISLATION
In Camp the Supreme Court expressed recognition of the under-
lying protectionist nature of the Glass-Steagall Act. The Court's
decision made little sense, but was perfectly consistent with the
congressional motives behind the Act. In Board of Governors v.
ICI, however, the Court completely ignored the motivating factors
that resulted in the Glass-Steagall Act being passed. The Court in-
stead examined only Congress' stated intent.
The stated intentions behind Glass-Steagall are impossible to
apply coherently. Bank safety and the elimination of conflicts of
interest are the articulated goals but application of the statutory
13' See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1949).
133 A different case is presented when the regulatory agency is policing and enforcing
the legislation for the benefit of the special interest group.
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language does not achieve these ends and to some extent the statu-
tory language is actually at odds with the legislative intent. Strict
judicial application of the statutory language by the courts would
reach results consistent with the terms of the bargain described in
this article.
However, in construing the Glass-Steagall Act, courts have some-
times given implicit recognition to the congressional motives and
at other times have given explicit recognition to ostensible congres-
sional intent.l34
Courts have also relied extensively on the expertise of adminis-
trative agencies in construing Glass-Steagall. These agencies have
no particular authority or power to administer the Glass-Steagall
Act - their power is only of a "general supervisory" nature.l35 Yet
courts have permitted the advice of these agencies which represent
interests hostile to the Act, effectively to undermine a long-stand-
ing legislative bargain. Finally courts have never settled on
whether to construe the Glass-Steagall Act narrowly or broadly.
This is surprising in one sense. The statute is, after all, more than
fifty years old. In another sense this unsettled state of affairs is
entirely understandable. It can be attributed to the incongruence
between the stated intent and the actual motive behind the statute
- it is impossible to apply the statute consistently without recog-
nition of the true motive of the legislature.
A. The Role of Legislative Intent in Reviewing Special Interest
Group Legislation
A statute passed at the behest of a special interest group is as
legitimate as either of the other kinds of statutes (public interest
and public sentiment) described above.l36 All three sorts of stat-
utes are the normal and predictable outcomes of the legislative
process. Often statutes will be difficult, if not impossible to catego-
IS4 See supra text accompanying notes 32-53 (discussion of ICI v. Camp).
136 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1976).
136 The Glass-Steagall Act is perhaps an extreme example of special interest group
legislation.
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rize.137 As Judge Posner has observed, courts do not have "the re-
search tools that they would need to discover the motives behind
the legislation."138 Once we recognize the possibility that the other
types of statutes exist, we must recognize the possibility of judicial
error in the categorization process. This element must be weighed
heavily before affording different judicial treatment for special in-
terest group legislation.
Furthermore, once legislators have struck political bargains with
a special interest group, both sides often have strong incentives to
cover their tracks by obfuscating their true purposes. Thus, even if
legislators had the resources to "conduct the kind of economic or
political science inquiry that might reveal the pattern of interest
group pressures behind the statute," it is unlikely that they would
find the results sufficiently conclusive to be of value.139 Judges
must limit the scope of their judicial inquiry to the formal public
legislative and statutory record. It is also true, on the other hand,
that some, if not all, of the obfuscation that takes place following a
political bargain between an interest group and a legislature will be
reflected in the legislative history of the Act. Posner, however, be-
lieves it to be more realistic to assume that the legislative history
reflects "the deal struck by the sponsors of the bill."l40 In the case
of the Glass-Steagall Act, however, and undoubtedly other laws as
well, the terms of the bargain are not accurately reflected in such
documents as committee reports and remarks to the congressional
record.141 Only the plain language of the statute serves as trustwor-
thy embodiment of the bargain flowing from a special interest stat-
ute. Posner argues that post-enactment expressions of legislative
intent are worthy of "little or no weight"l42 since the deal is over
once the statute is enacted and such subsequent expressions might
simply express the desire of one or two particular legislators to re-
nege on the deal. Posner, however, suggests no reason for his con-
137 See Posner, supra note 4, at 272 (boundary between special interest group legisla-
tion and public interest group legislation is indistinct).
138 ld.
13. ld.
140 ld. at 275.
141 But see Posner, supra note 4, at 274-75.
14' ld. at 275.
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clusion that pre-enactment history is somehow entitled to more
weight. While the legislature as a whole can renege on a deal, one
or two individual legislators cannot. Legislative history, whether it
is created before or after a statute is enacted, is likely to be pur-
posefully deceptive or to be an effort by a small number of con-
gressmen to renege on their bargain.
B. The Role of Deference to Administrative Authority in Re-
viewing Special Interest Group Legislation
At least in the case of the Glass-Steagall Act, deference to ad-
ministrative authority may lead to the invalidation of legislation
that has been motivated by special interest groups. One need not
embrace a "capture" theory of administrative rulemaking to see
why this is SO.143 It is noteworthy that in evaluating the legality of
commercial bank sales of commercial paper, the Federal Reserve
Board followed the same line of reasoning as the court in A.G.
Becker v. Board of Governors.144 First the Board, examining what
it described as "indirect" historical evidence, concluded that Con-
gress did not consider commercial paper to be a security when it
passed the Act.145 In reaching this conclusion, the Board also em-
phasized that a commercial bank's sales of commercial paper does
not threaten the policies behind Glass-Steagall because the Board's
own regulatory expertise would sufficiently protect the public from
any unsound banking practices that might result when commercial
banks sell commercial paper.146 Although such analysis is plausibly
correct, it ignores the true motives behind Congress' decision to
divide commercial and investment banking, and substitutes the
will of an administrative agency for the agreement struck with the
legislature.
143 As used here, "capture theory" represents the idea that frequently regulatory agen-
cies come to be dominated by the industries regulated. Posner, supra note 2, at 341. See
also S. HUNTINGTON, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the
Public Interest in Public Administration and Policy, in SELECTED ESSAYS (P. Wolled ed.
1966); H. ZIEGLER, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 93-126 (1964).
,.. See supra text accompanying notes 112-131.
143 Federal Reserve Statement, supra note 112, at 14. See also Note, supra note 24, at
116.
148 See Federal Reserve Statement, supra note 112, at 25.
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Judicial deference to the administrative decision-making process
also may result in a dramatic increase in the costs to an interest
group of getting what it wants from a legislature. If the interest
group must not only persuade Congress (and such persuasion is
highly costly) to pass a set of rules, but also must persuade an ad-
ministrative agency to enforce the rules, the costs increase dramat-
ically. The price of getting a statute passed represents a one-time
fixed expense. The cost of continuing influence with an administra-
tive agency is ongoing. In the Glass-Steagall example used in this
article, the costs to commercial banks of influencing administrative
outcomes regarding Glass-Steagall decisions can be amortized over
dozens of other issues that banks are constantly debating with
their regulators. Commercial banks can bargain with the regulators
who have incentives to maximize both their own and their clients'
influence vis-a-vis other interests, and. can give up ground in other
areas in order to achieve the desired result regarding Glass-Stea-
gall. Investment banks are regulated by the Securities Exchange
Commission, and have little if any contact with the Federal Re-
serve Board, or the Comptroller, who regulate banks.147 These in-
vestment banks - the intended beneficiaries of the statute -have
nothing to bargain with when dealing with agencies.
At first glance, therefore, one's view of the proper degree of def-
erence to administrative authority when reviewing special interest
group legislation depends largely on how one views the particular
legislation in the first place. If the increased cost of administrative
deference actually cuts down on the amount of such legislation,
then those generally opposed to this kind of legislation will favor
administrative agency involvement. It is more likely, however, that
147 Commercial banks must be chartered under either state or federal law. Federally
chartered ("national") banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency, 12 U.S.C. §§
21-24, 26-27 (1976 & Supp. v. 1981). National banks must also join the Federal Reserve
System, 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1976). State chartered ("State") banks are regulated by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board ("Fed") if they join the Federal Reserve System, 12 U.S.C. §§ 321, 324-
25 (1976). Thus either the Comptroller or the Fed will have primary regulatory authority
over national banks or state banks.
Banks are subject to the supervision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) if they are federally insured. National banks are required to carry such insurance. 12
U.S.C. § 222, 1814(b) (1976). The vast majority of state banks voluntarily purchase such
insurance. 1980 FDIC ANN. REP. 226.
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fear of judicial deference to administrative agencies will result in a
proliferation of legislation that allows interest group members to
achieve enforcement by circumventing administrative bodies.148
Creating express private rights of action is the most satisfactory
way to achieve this result. This is consistent with the court's deci-
sion on the standing question in Camp.149 Of course, in the case of
the Glass-Steagall Act, there was no way for either side to predict
the degree of deference that is being awarded administrative agen-
cies, since Glass-Steagall was passed in 1933, while the Administra-
tive Procedures Act did not become law until 1946. As for statutes
passed more recently, however, .the precise standard of administra-
tive review, like the presence of a private right of action, is simply
part of the deal that was struck with the interest group, and courts
should not intervene in this process.
C. Statutory Construction
Courts thwart the deals struck between special interest groups
and legislatures in numerous ways as a purely natural consequence
of the judicial function. When courts invalidate legislation because
it is not "rationally related to a proper legislative purpose," laws
are often being invalidated merely because they are procured by
some interest group.lIlO Similarly, the long-held rule that statutes
in derogation of the common law be strictly construed seems
designed to thwart special interest legislation.l51 Recognition of the
fact of special interest group legislation implies that these judi-
cially created doctrines should be abandoned by courts, since they
intrude upon the bargaining process that is a hallmark of our legis-
lative system. Recognition of the place of legislation that affords
us It is also likely that interest groups will attempt to convince Congress that there is a
strong need for administrative supervision over the activities of their competitors. Such su-
pervision will, of course, impose additional costs on the operations of these competitors, and
thereby serve the interests of the competitors not faced with such costs.
us See supra text accompanying notes 58-6l.
100 See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 495-96 (2d ed. 1977); Linde,
Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Posner, supra note 4, at 285; but
see Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong With Rationality Review, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 503-06 (1979).
101 Cf. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4,15-25,132-37,155-57
(1982) (discussing the rule).
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special protection to certain factions has a long and distinguished
place in political science literature.162 As Holmes once said: "It is
no sufficient condemnation of legislation that it favors one class at
the expense of another; for much or all legislation does that."l68 It
is beyond peradventure, therefore, that it is improper for courts to
disfavor legislation merely because it is the product of a bargain
struck with a special interest group. Thus, the Supreme Court is
faced with a dilemma in Becker. On the one hand, it can promote
more efficient markets by allowing banks to deal in commercial pa-
per but only by failing to enforce a clearly constitutional, legiti-
mate statute. But preserving the "bargain" will not further the os-
tensible intent of Congress in preserving a well-functioning
financial market.
The purpose of this paper has been to point out that, by its very
structure, an independent judiciary places severe obstacles on the
efficacy and longevity of special interest legislation. This indepen-
dent judiciary is not a beneficiary of the bargain between the legis-
lature and the interest group and thus has no incentive to enforce
the bargain unless it is apparent in the words of the statute. More-
over, the judiciary must justify its decisions, but special interest
legislation such as Glass-Steagall simply cannot be justified absent
recognition of the bargain the parties have attempted to obfuscate.
1•• See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); O.W. HOLMES, Herbert Spencer:
Legislation and Empiricism, in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND
UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS, 104, 107-09 (H. Shriver ed. 1936) ("the more powerful
interests must be more or less reflected in legislation"); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL
PROCESS (1951); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. I,
20-21, 23 (1972).
1.3 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 152, at 108.
